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New York

Chairman: Mr. Kiwanuka ..... (Uganda)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Agenda items 57, 58 and 60 to 73 (*continued*)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security items

The Chairman: As I mentioned last Thursday, in accordance with the programme of work and timetable, the Committee will begin today the second phase of its work: the thematic discussion on item subjects, as well as the introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items.

I would like to reiterate that during this stage of work, a certain degree of flexibility shall be maintained, as in previous sessions of the Committee. In accordance with the decisions taken concerning the rationalization of the work of the First Committee, this next stage of the Committee's work will combine the discussion of specific subjects and the introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions.

Delegates may recall that document A/C.1/57/CPR.2, containing subjects for the thematic discussions, was circulated during the previous meeting.

Let me, on behalf of myself, the bureau and, indeed, the Committee, express our deepest condolences to the Government and people of Indonesia for the tragedy that occurred.

We shall now commence the thematic discussion.

Mr. Guerreiro (Brazil): Allow my delegation to join in the feelings of grief for the events in Indonesia. I would like to convey of Indonesia the sincere condolences of the Brazilian delegation.

Delegates will recall that by its resolution 55/33A of 20 November 2000, entitled "Missiles", the General Assembly requested of the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts to be established on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to prepare a report for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session on the issue of missiles in all its aspects.

It is my pleasure and honour today to introduce the results of the Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, which I had the honour and privilege to chair. The report of the Panel, which is contained in document A/57/229, constitutes the first effort by the United Nations to address the issue of missiles in all its aspects.

In his foreword to the report, the Secretary-General pointed out that

> "The international community has long been concerned by the accumulation, proliferation, technical refinement and threat and use of ballistic and other types of missiles. In response, States have pursued various unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures. Nonetheless, there is no universally accepted norm or instrument specifically governing the development, testing,

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production, acquisition, transfer, deployment or use of missiles."

The Panel's work was conducted over a period of nearly two years. It was certainly not an easy task. The experts faced the challenge without losing sight of the prevailing political circumstances in which the exercise took place and took into account the wide diversity of views and concerns with respect to analyzing a multifaceted and complex subject and of providing useful conclusions. The Panel discussed the issue of missiles in a comprehensive, balanced and non-discriminatory manner as a contribution to international peace and security.

I would like to highlight briefly some of the most important findings of our work. All experts agreed that the issues related to missiles have a serious bearing on international peace and security. There are concerns of both a regional and a global order. They are, inter alia, related to the increasing number of missiles, their ranges, technological sophistication and geographical distribution, as well as their capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons, as well as conventional weapons.

There are issues related to missile defences and their strategic consequences, to the inherent similarities between the technologies used for space-launch vehicles and their peaceful applications and those required for ballistic missiles with military purposes. The Panel also considered the continuing role of missiles in military doctrines, as well as the role and scope of confidence-building measures.

In its discussion, the Panel identified various measures dealing with missiles. While past and existing treaties and agreements make revisions on particular types or aspects of missiles and while some States have adopted related, unilateral measures, the experts concluded that there is at present no universal norm, treaty or agreement governing the development, testing, production, acquisition, transfer, deployment or use specifically of missiles. Taking into consideration the various concerns that were identified, the Panel found it essential to have continued international efforts to deal with the issue of missiles in the interest of international peace and security.

It noted the role of the United Nations in the field of missiles. The Panel also noted the multiple approaches that are being currently employed to deal with the issue of missiles both within and outside the United Nations. It could not, however, single out any particular course of action or combination of actions on the issue. The Panel agreed that the issues identified in the report and all approaches undertaken at the national, bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral levels need to be further explored.

While the results of the study may seem rather modest, I would like to underscore that the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts is the result of a hard-won consensus on an issue that is very complex, both politically and technically. The report reflects in a balanced manner the different perspectives on the issue of missiles. It provides a useful tool for future work on the issue by the United Nations. I submit the report to you for your consideration.

In closing, let me extend my warmest appreciation to the experts who participated in this exercise and who, through their flexibility and readiness to compromise, made this report possible. I would also like to extend my special thanks to the Department for Disarmament, especially to Under-Secretary-General Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala and to Mr. Valère Mantels, who served as Secretary of the Panel. I also wish to thank both the consultants, Mr. Christophe Carle from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and Mr. Waheguru Pal Sidhu, from the International Peace Academy, for their valuable assistance and support to the work of the Panel.

Mr. Smith (Australia): This debate is about nuclear weapons. However, it is impossible for any Australian representative today not to allude to the horrific event that occurred in Bali this weekend. What happened is a reminder to us all — particularly here in New York, just 12 twelve months after the devastating attack on the World Trade Center — that weapons of mass destruction are not the sole security challenge that we collectively face. Terrorism takes lives in smaller groups than do weapons of mass destruction, but it strikes just as indiscriminately and will be defeated only with common resolve, common purpose and common action. I would like to extend my condolences, through the representative of Indonesia, to the Government and the people of his country, and to the families of all the victims, who came from many different countries represented in this room, including my own.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains one of the most serious challenges to global peace and security. Australia, as a non-Nuclear State, is therefore strongly committed to efforts seeking to curb the spread of such weapons and to work towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. Adherence to and strengthening of the existing the nuclear non-proliferation disarmament framework is a key element of that process.

Australia welcomed the commitments given at the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the constructive outcomes of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. We also welcome the strong support for draft resolutions in the First Committee last year that reaffirmed the centrality of the NPT in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process. This was a clear indication of the international community's undiminished commitment to the NPT and to the practical measures agreed at the 2000 Review Conference.

We welcome and are pleased to join in sponsoring Japan's draft resolution (A/C.1/57/L.42) on a path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We particularly welcome those paragraphs in the draft resolution in that give expression to the outcomes of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and which underscore the importance of their full implementation. We hope that the draft resolution on that subject will again attract wide cross-group support including from the nuclear-weapon States.

Australia firmly believes that the goal of nuclear disarmament can be achieved only through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps. In that regard, early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the productive of fissile material for nuclear weapons are critical.

Accordingly, Australia strongly supports the CTBT, and is actively pursuing an ongoing programme to secure further signatures and ratifications. In that respect, I draw attention to the joint declaration that Australia, Japan and the Netherlands launched last month in New York in support of the CTBT. The declaration encouraged ongoing support for the development of the CTBT verification machinery and adherence to the Treaty, and it set out an action plan to expedite entry into force of the Treaty. We encourage other United Nations Members to associate themselves with the declaration before it is submitted to the Secretary-General.

While it has yet to enter into force, the CTBT has already made a powerful contribution to non-proliferation and disarmament. With 166 signatures and 94 ratifications, the Treaty is a clear expression of the international community's collective will to halt nuclear weapons test explosions. Australia welcomes and is pleased to be a sponsor, with New Zealand, of Mexico's draft resolution on the CTBT (A/C.1/57/L.4). We hope the draft resolution on this subject will again attract wide support.

The international community has long identified the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty as one of the most urgent disarmament and non-proliferation steps the international community should take. Yet, despite having been repeatedly endorsed by all States present here, negotiations on such a treaty have yet to commence. Australia therefore welcomes the submission by Canada of the draft resolution on a cut-off treaty (A/C.1/57/L.44) as an expression of the determination of the international community to work together to conclude a multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We very much hope that the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

Australia looks to joining with other delegations in the course of the work of the First Committee in supporting draft resolutions that make a useful and practical contribution to our collective efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Mr. McGinnis (United States of America): I would like first of all to join others who have expressed their condolences and sense of outrage this morning with regard to the horrific event which occurred over the weekend in Bali, Indonesia. To my Indonesian and Australian colleagues, to the representatives of those other nations whose citizens were killed or injured and to the families of the victims, I offer my Government's deepest sympathies. This sad occurrence reminds us once again of the need for all peace-loving nations to work tirelessly and cooperatively to root out the terror networks that threaten us all.

Let me now return to the subject of today's debate: nuclear weapons. The United States and the

Russian Federation have jointly introduced draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.23, "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework."

In Moscow, on 24 May this year, our two countries signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions — the Moscow Treaty — along with an accompanying Joint Declaration. We believe that those two documents were positive, concrete achievements in our bilateral relationship and major developments in the reduction of nuclear weapons. We also believe that the strategic reductions the United States and Russia pledged in the Moscow Treaty advance the commitment of both of our nations under article VI of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Taken together, the Moscow Treaty and the Joint Declaration highlight our strengthening bilateral relationship, the new strategic framework, and our mutual determination to work towards a peaceful world. They represent a new, positive direction both for our mutual cooperation and for enhanced international security.

Draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.23 recognizes that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations between the United States and the Russian Federation, based on mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. It also recognizes our joint determination to work together, and with other nations and international organizations to promote security, economic well-being and a peaceful, prosperous, free world. As one example of that commitment to multilateral cooperation, draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.23 highlights the results of the Kananaskis Summit of the Group of Eight, at which leaders launched a Global Partnership for the support of specific projects to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues.

The United States believes that the reductions in strategic nuclear warheads to which we and Russia have agreed, the new direction in relations between the United States and Russia and our mutual determination to work toward goals cherished by all deserve the endorsement of the world community. We hope that draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.23 can be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): At the outset, I should like to express our deepest sympathies to the delegation of Indonesia and to the delegations of other countries that suffered casualties as a result of the tragic events that took place recently in Bali.

The Russian Federation, together with the United States of America, is submitting to the First Committee for its consideration the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/57/L.23, entitled "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework". The Treaty concluded between Russia and the United States at the Moscow summit in May this year on reducing strategic offensive capabilities confirms our commitment to a course of ongoing reductions of nuclear weapons. That document sets out agreements on the mutual reduction, by 31 December 2012, of the total number of strategic nuclear warheads to an agreed level that does not exceed 1,700 to 2,200 units for each of the parties. In other words, it calls for a reduction to levels approximately three times lower than those established under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I).

The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions was made possible mostly by the new strategic relations between Russia and the United States, enshrined in the Joint Declaration adopted at Moscow in May. In that Declaration, Russia and the United States not only expressed their intention to build partnerships based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability, but also reaffirmed their determination to work together with other States and with international organizations in order to strengthen peace and strategic security. That is also reflected in the draft resolution that we are submitting.

In the light of the objective linkage between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, the parties agreed in the Joint Declaration to implement a number of measures aimed at confidence-building and at enhancing transparency in the field of anti-missile defence. Dialogue on those issues, linked to a subsequent strengthening of global strategic security, has already begun in the Consultative Group for Strategic Security among the ministers for foreign affairs and for defence of Russia and the United States.

At their first meeting, held on 21 September this year in Washington, the parties considered the issue of implementing the May agreements and, in particular,

established a framework for enhancing the effectiveness of their work. In that regard, the Consultative Group will rely on working groups of experts in thematic areas such as strategic offensive weapons, anti-missile defence and non-proliferation. It is also important to note that START I will continue in force and, with the consent of the parties, can be extended, which means that the strategic offensive capabilities of Russia and of the United States will be subject to dual mutually complementary limitations under both treaties. Russia is planning to ratify the new Treaty by the end of this year.

The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions will play an important role in strengthening the system of international treaties and agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control. It will also constitute a significant contribution by Russia and the United States to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, through the implementation of obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Also of unquestionable international significance is the stated commitment of Russia and the United States, in the Joint Declaration, to work both bilaterally and multilaterally to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of their delivery, particularly in the context of combating terrorism.

As called for in the draft resolution, we must unite the efforts of the entire international community, on the basis of generally recognized principles of non-proliferation — including the principles approved by the leaders of the Group of Eight at the Kananaskis Summit, held in June 2002 — to meet the current objective of preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological or biological weapons, missiles, or related components, equipment or technologies. Those principles are aimed at intensifying the fight against terrorism and strengthening international security, and they in no way constitute an impediment to the socio-economic development of States.

We should like to express our sincere gratitude to all the States participating in the work of the First Committee that have welcomed in their statements the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty between Russia and the United States. We call on all members to support the draft resolution submitted for consideration by Russia and the United States, "Bilateral strategic nuclear arms reductions and the new strategic framework". We look forward to the adoption of that draft resolution by consensus.

Ms. Valle Pereira (Brazil) (*spoke in Spanish*): On behalf of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile — States parties and associates of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) — I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on the high quality of the First Committee's work during the current session and to express our appreciation for the cooperation provided by the members of the Bureau thus far.

Our consideration of the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is welcomed by the expanded MERCOSUR, which was the first organized subregion to formally become a party to that important Treaty. That indicates the historic commitment of our countries to improving the mechanisms and instruments in the sphere of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of other weapons of mass destruction. In particular, I should like to put on record that the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, at its 32nd regular session, held on 4 June this year, adopted its resolution 1876, which urged States in the region that had not yet done so — especially the countries included in annex 2 to the Treaty — to sign or to ratify it, as appropriate, so that it might enter into force as soon as possible. We have already achieved important progress in that regard with the decisions adopted at the Second Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, chaired by Mexico, and through the combined efforts of Mexico and other States in the period following that meeting.

The international community faces a changing reality full of challenges. This year, we initiated the process that will lead to the holding of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We hope that the Conference will lead to the strengthening of international peace and security through concrete measures in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Without question, we are concerned at the possibility that weapons of mass destruction might get into the hands of terrorists. But we do not believe that measures to counter such threats can justify in any way the indefinite retention of such weapons by those that

have them or any other steps that could lead to uncertainty as to the full enforcement of the NPT.

We have witnessed with concern the recent tension in South Asia between two States operating nuclear installations not subject to safeguards. This confirms our belief that the NPT must speedily be implemented. The effective implementation of the NPT must lead to a firm, clear cut and unequivocal commitment on the part of States that have not yet signed and ratified it to do so and thus to lead us to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Those countries must give a very clear cut indication of their intentions with regard to the Treaty. The putting in place of an international monitoring system must be paralleled by prospects that the NPT will become a full-fledged reality. The functioning of the monitoring system must not be hastened merely on the basis of technical considerations that do not take into account the universal and non-discriminatory nature of the Treaty that gave rise to the system.

In conclusion, let me say that at the same time that the countries members of MERCOSUR express their readiness to promote increased international accession to the NPT, they express their strongest support for retaining a moratorium on nuclear testing until the Treaty comes into force.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Hungary, President of the Conference on Disarmament, to introduce the report of the Conference.

Mr. Szabó (Hungary): Allow me to extend to you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on your election to the high office of Chairman of the Committee and wish you every success in discharging your responsibilities.

I take the floor in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament to present the report (A/57/27) of the Conference on its 2002 session and the related draft resolution, which is contained in document A/C.1/57/L.13. The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has a crucial role to play in addressing existing and new challenges in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The terrorist attacks of 11 September last year against the United States made it clear that the world is confronted with a qualitatively new threat with serious repercussions in such fields as nuclear non-proliferation, safety and security. They made the international community aware of the need to explore new measures for halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Those tragic events must be a catalyst for the Conference to resume substantive work with a renewed sense of urgency.

The 2002 session of the Conference saw valuable attempts to breach the existing divergences of views on key issues on the disarmament agenda in order to overcome the stalemate that continues to paralyze the work of the Conference. Intensive consultations were conducted in 2002 by the successive Presidents of the Conference in order to reach consensus on a programme of work. A group of former Presidents of the Conference — Ambassadors Dembri, Lint, Reyes Rodríguez, Salandre and Vega — presented to the Conference a joint proposal on a comprehensive programme of work. This evolutionary cross-group initiative takes into account earlier proposals, in particular the Amorim proposal, as well as the various views of States Members of the Conference. That unprecedented, promising proposal enjoyed appreciation from a wide range of delegations and will be further explored during preparations for the 2003 session.

The Conference also demonstrated its ability to address new challenges by revisiting the issue of radiological weapons through a number of open-ended consultations. The Conference also decided to appoint Special Coordinators on the review of its agenda, on the expansion of its membership and on its improved effective functioning. While agreeing that priority should be given to pursuing substantive work, the Conference recommended that Special Coordinators on relevant procedural issues should be appointed, if deemed necessary, during its 2003 session.

In order to promote substantive progress during the 2003 session, the Conference has requested me, as well as the incoming President, to conduct appropriate consultations during the intersessional period and to make recommendations recognizing the support of the Conference for the Amorin proposal, taking into account all existing proposals, views presented and discussions held in this year's session.

I can assure members that no effort will be spared to come up with a proposal to end the stalemate in the Conference. Despite these efforts and new initiatives, the Conference, however, could not manage to agree on a programme of work. It was generally felt that

political will, especially on the part of the key players, remains essential to resume substantive activities.

The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/57/L.13 follows, in general, the usual pattern and content of resolutions on the subject adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly. However, it also attempts to encapsulate the main achievements of the Conference during its 2002 session, as I outlined before. These developments, recorded in the report of the Conference, have been faithfully translated into the language of the draft resolution, particularly in its paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, which, after broad and intensive discussions, enjoys the support of the Conference member States.

The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, despite its current stalemate, continues to play an important role in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. This draft resolution, if adopted, will without doubt provide stimulus to the commencement of the substantive work of the Conference. Therefore, I would recommend that draft resolution in A/C.1/57/L.13 be adopted by consensus.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): Let me also join preceding speakers in conveying our deepest condolences to the delegation of Indonesia with respect to the deadly terrorist attack in Bali over the weekend. We also offer our condolences to those other delegations whose nationals perished in that cowardly act of terror.

I have asked for the floor to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/57/L.40, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons," on behalf of the delegations of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Fiji, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Viet Nam, Zambia and my own delegation.

The provision of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States is an obligation which arises from the United Nations Charter. The Charter obligates Member States not to use, or threaten to use, force. This obligation extends to the non-use of and non-threat of use of any weapons, including nuclear weapons. Indeed, this fact was underlined by the resolution of the General Assembly adopted at its first session, which outlawed nuclear weapons.

The demand for security assurances was raised by the non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s. It crystallized in 1968, during the concluding phase of the negotiations for the NPT. The response of the nuclear-weapon States, reflected in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), was considered grossly inadequate by the non-nuclear-weapon States.

At the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament (SSOD I), agreement was reached for the conclusion of an international instrument that would provide binding and credible negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. However, the declarations made by four of the five nuclear-weapon States at SSOD I, and later at the NPT Extension Conference, and reflected in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), was also considered insufficient, qualified and partial by most of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

At the end of the cold war, there was a general expectation that it would become easier for nuclear-weapon States to extend nuclear security assurances to the non-possessor States. Unfortunately, the situation, instead of becoming easier, has become more complex, for the following reasons.

First, with the indefinite extension of the NPT, most nuclear-weapon States have presumed the permanent right to retain nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the commitment contained in article VI of the NPT for complete nuclear disarmament has remained open-ended, even after the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which called for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, new doctrines of possible use of nuclear weapons, contrary to resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995) of the Security Council, have been propounded, involving, for example, the use of nuclear weapons against the use, or threat of use, of biological and chemical weapons.

Fourthly, one major nuclear-weapon State, which formerly adhered to the principle of the non-first use of nuclear weapons, has now disavowed this principle and has adopted the posture of first use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, two additional nuclear-arms States have emerged on the world scene, and there is one other

presumed nuclear-arms State whose status and obligations remain unclear.

Under the circumstances, the conclusion of credible negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States has gained greater urgency. The sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/57/L.40 seek to underline and to operationalize this sense of urgency.

The draft is similar to the ones adopted at previous sessions of the Committee. It reaffirms the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements on negative security assurances. It notes with satisfaction that there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention on the subject. It appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work towards an early agreement, and it recommends further intensification of efforts to evolve a common approach and a common formula on this issue.

Finally, it recommends that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations, with a view to reaching early agreement on negative security assurances.

The sponsors believe that the conclusion of effective arrangements on negative security assurances could constitute a major confidence-building measure in the current tense international situation between the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as among the nuclear-weapon States. Secondly, it could contribute to reducing the nuclear danger. It could ease the threats which arise from new doctrines of nuclear use and facilitate negotiations for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation and the sponsors therefore urge the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.40 by the widest possible margin.

Mr. Wespal (Canada): I wish to join those who spoke before me in expressing heartfelt sympathy and condolences to the Government and to the people of Indonesia, as well as to the families and friends in many countries — including Canada — of victims of the horrific act of terror on Bali this past weekend. The cowards who did this do not daunt us. They unite us, rather, in fresh resolve to bring them down.

Earlier terror in this country, a year ago on 11 September, vividly demonstrated our vulnerability to those prepared to use modern technology for mass murder. Our Committee and other international bodies have responded with fresh determination to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to confront the lethal risks posed by stockpiles of sensitive materials, and to reinforce multilateralism at the core of international non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament action.

The Group of Eight, over which Canada now presides, responded by launching in June a Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Equally important is the universal adoption of the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the Additional Protocol, and the strengthening of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

With all this recent talk about weapons of mass destruction as a single category, we need always to remember that nuclear weapons are in a class of their own: utterly indiscriminate and indescribably lethal. Canada remains deeply committed to the promise at the heart of the NPT, and its recognition that non-proliferation and credible progress towards disarmament are fundamentally interdependent.

This interdependence was clear in the 13-step Action Plan agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. That is why Canada has emphasized the reporting requirement outlined in the twelfth step of that Plan as a key measure to ensure transparency and reinforce the accountability on which the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 was based. That is why we have welcomed the reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the Treaty of Moscow as evidence of United States and Russian fidelity to article VI, and it is why we are pleased to co-sponsor the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) put forward by Mexico and co-sponsored by Australia and New Zealand.

It is also why I am pleased this morning to present formally draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.44, entitled "The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning

the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

The draft resolution is identical to resolution 56/24 J of last year, which was adopted without a vote by this Committee and by the General Assembly.

We are all aware of the long history of this proposal and of the fact that complex negotiations lie ahead. The draft resolution is essentially procedural, and is anchored firmly in the expectations and current realities of the international community. It expresses determination that we might all, together, conclude an effectively and internationally verifiable multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons or other explosive devices. Such a treaty is fundamental to both disarmament and non-proliferation. We very much hope that the draft resolution will be adopted without amendment and without a vote.

The draft resolution already has a large number of sponsors from all regions. We continue to welcome all who wish to join us as sponsors in this expression of fundamental security interest.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Brazil to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.34.

Ms. Valle Pereira (Brazil): I have the honour of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.34, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas", on behalf of the following sponsors: Angola, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Colombia, the Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Tonga, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Viet Nam. I also wish to acknowledge that, since draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.34 was submitted, other countries have also decided to sponsor it. I would like to point out that the majority of those countries are members of the four existing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

This is the seventh consecutive year in which a draft resolution on this important matter has been introduced for consideration in the First Committee. Once again, Brazil has the honour of being joined by New Zealand in initiating a draft resolution that in last year's version received 148 votes in favour. That adoption by an overwhelming majority was consistent with the pattern that has characterized the adoption of such texts since 1996. We express the hope that draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.34 will enjoy similar broad support. This year's draft resolution has some changes relative to resolution 56/24 G. Besides the required updating, it alludes to two particularly important developments. First, it welcomes the decision taken by Cuba to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will result in the establishment of the first inhabited nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing all the States of Latin American and Caribbean. Secondly, it welcomes the ratification by the Kingdom of Tonga of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which completes the list of regional parties to the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone. These are important steps in our progress towards the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere, and we warmly commend them.

The further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions is one of the most significant measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Gradually, in various parts of the world, the nuclear option is being ruled out. As a nuclear-weapon-free world is an aspiration of our peoples, the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons is reinforced by extending, through new nuclear-weapon-free zones, the geographical space where they are illegal. Taken together with the Antarctic Treaty, the regional treaties contribute to freeing from nuclear weapons the southern hemisphere, as well as the adjacent areas north of the equator where the treaties apply.

The States parties to those treaties, in close consultation with their neighbours, have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and have accepted stringent verification commitments to that effect. Our initiative aims to achieve recognition by the General Assembly, for the seventh consecutive year, of the progressive emergence of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. Such recognition should be viewed as confirmation of the international community's commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament. We want to reiterate that, as in previous years, our draft resolution does not create new legal obligations. Neither does it contradict any norm of international law applicable to navigation, such as those contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We call upon those

States that have not yet done so to move towards ratification of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their protocols. The idea that most of the globe is free from nuclear weapons is a powerful one. It adds momentum to the process of nuclear disarmament and bolsters the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We wish to put on record our appreciation to all those who voted in favour of resolution 56/24 G last year. We expect this year's text to continue to receive the support that it deserves from all States committed to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of India to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.51.

Mr. Sood (India): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons", contained in document A/C.1/57/L.51, under agenda item 67 (d). The draft resolution is sponsored by Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, the Congo, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Fiji, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, the Sudan, Tuvalu, Viet Nam, Zambia and India.

The draft resolution underlines the need to address threats to international peace and security and to take certain measures to eliminate those threats. The spectre of nuclear threat from nations or groups cannot be wished away as long as such weapons are not eradicated completely. The security to which we and future generations are entitled can be achieved only by the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

It is a matter of deep concern that nuclear weapons continue to be viewed as a legitimate currency of power, with some countries claiming the right to possess them in perpetuity. Doctrines of first use have been revalidated and reaffirmed. There are those who reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear threats or threats from other weapons of mass destruction.

This threat to humanity must be addressed at all levels. At the level of political commitment, backed by legally binding agreements, nuclear doctrines should be oriented towards no-first-use and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon States. It would be a good beginning in the process of de-legitimizing nuclear weapons globally.

We believe that the international community should actively participate in a step-by-step process towards a legally binding instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There should remain no scope for justification of the use of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution, as in previous years, reiterates that "the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind". It refers to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 1996 that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict and that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would strengthen international security and contribute to the creation of a climate that would be decisive for negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The ICJ also pronounced the need for negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective international control. The ICJ, by making international humanitarian law applicable to the use of nuclear weapons, provided the legal underpinning for such an instrument.

We remain committed to the goal of global nuclear disarmament, and it is in this context that my delegation is bringing before this Committee, once again, as it has done since 1982, a draft resolution calling for a convention to be negotiated for "prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances".

The draft resolution requests the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

We, along with the other sponsors of this draft resolution, believe that it will receive the widest possible support in this Committee so that the international community can take this very decisive step towards freeing the world of nuclear weapons.

Ms. Inoguchi (Japan): First of all, I would like to extend sincere condolences on behalf of my Government, through the delegation of Indonesia, to the people and the Government of Indonesia, and our deepest sympathy goes out to those who lost their

family members in the terrible explosion in Bali over the weekend.

I have asked to take the floor in order to introduce a draft resolution entitled "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons", contained in document A/C.1./57/L.42. We highly appreciate Australia's having already become a sponsor of the draft resolution

Every year since 1994, the Government of Japan has submitted a draft resolution on the elimination of nuclear weapons, and it has always been adopted with overwhelming support.

As the only country affected by nuclear bombs, Japan's diplomatic effort each year in tabling a nuclear disarmament draft resolution demonstrates the genuine wish of its people for the realization of a safe world, free of nuclear weapons.

The Government of Japan believes that nuclear disarmament should be advanced by taking concrete steps, one by one, towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This draft resolution presents a path composed of such steps.

Allow me to explain some of the salient points contained in the draft resolution: first of all, it continues to fully endorse the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). All States should reaffirm their determination to implement all the conclusions of the Review Conference, including the practical steps related to article VI, by supporting this draft resolution. I would like to confirm, in particular, the fact that an unequivocal undertaking was already given at the 2000 NPT Review Conference by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It is necessary to continue to stress the importance of this undertaking.

Secondly, the draft resolution strongly advocates the importance and urgency of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As I indicated in my general statement, Japan is among those countries which are most actively promoting the entry into force of the CTBT. At the same time, in view of the current situation, in which the prospects for the early entry into force of the CTBT are not encouraging, it is also important to call for the continuation of moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions, pending the achievement of that goal.

Thirdly, the draft resolution calls for the establishment of two subsidiary bodies, one to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the other to deal with nuclear disarmament, as early as possible, during the 2003 session of the Conference on Disarmament. This appeal is reflective of our belief that the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament must be broken, so that substantive work can begin immediately.

Fourthly, the draft resolution also calls for a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It should be recalled that it was not possible to include this measure in the agreement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference; however, in our draft resolution, we have explicitly called for it. We believe that this measure will carry the agenda of nuclear disarmament one step further and will build upon the agreement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Fifthly, the draft resolution mentions the need for deeper reduction by all nuclear-weapon States as they work towards the total elimination of these weapons.

Finally, in view of the paramount importance of the fight against terrorism, the draft resolution also addresses the need to take concrete measures to prevent nuclear, as well as radiological, terrorism.

The co-sponsoring Governments believe that strong support for this draft resolution will demonstrate the firm commitment of the international community to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Mr. Esenli (Turkey): Mr. Chairman, my delegation did not intend to take the floor at this point. However, in the wake of the terrorist attack that showed its dastardly face, this time in Bali, late on Saturday, we were compelled to do so. On behalf of my delegation, I wish to extend our condolences to the Government of Indonesia and our sympathies and condolences to the grieving families that lost their loved ones, and to those delegations whose citizens perished, namely, Australia, Singapore, Canada, United States, United Kingdom and Ecuador, according to early accounts. The terrorist attack in Bali is another stark reminder that terrorism does not have a set of rules to which the members of civilized societies in this room can relate. The only motto that terrorism upholds is "everything and anything is acceptable as long as it

sows the seeds of fear, panic and desperation in people, and as long as it shakes the fundamental principles on which the international community stands".

Turkey is a country that has suffered extensively from the scourge of terrorism. The only way to fight this global menace is to act resolutely and in unison. For this Committee, we have to do everything that is necessary to avoid terrorists' getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction, inter alia, nuclear weapons.

Mr. Wiranata-Atmadja (Indonesia): Allow me, on behalf of the Government and delegation of Indonesia, through you, Mr. Chairman, to thank the delegations that have expressed their sympathy and condolences about the tragic event that recently occurred in Bali. The Government of Indonesia has made it very clear that we will continue our commitment to fight terrorism.

For a number of years, nuclear and related issues have been the preoccupation of this Committee. The deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament has perhaps rendered our task more important in meeting the growing concern over the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament. Hence it is expected that we seek wider areas of agreement on issues which have for so long eluded us. That may facilitate the resumption of negotiations in Geneva.

Nuclear issues constitute a continuum that includes, inter alia, the non-proliferation regime, nuclear-weapon-free zones, banning the use of fissile materials for weapons, access to relevant technology for peaceful purposes and security assurances. Specifically, the inseparable nature of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament has long been self-evident. In its absence, the edifice and infrastructure built around the total abolition of such weapons cannot continue on a viable and durable foundation.

An agreement or treaty to cut deployed arsenals, while keeping large contingency arsenals in reserve stockpiles, is not what the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation or Nuclear Weapon States (NPT) had in mind when they pursued a renewed commitment to article VI in their 1995 statement of principles and objectives. Nor is that what they had in mind, at the 2000 NPT review exercise, when they secured an unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States in the final document to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Reiterating strategic doctrines, developing and acquiring nuclear weapons and maintaining a permanent rationale are incompatible with those commitments. Rather than incremental progress, concrete and credible advances have become imperative, including deep unilateral and reciprocal cuts in offensive capabilities.

Equally important is the freezing of the total number of arsenals at the current levels. One critical issue is the extent and pace of negotiations leading to the total abolition of nuclear arsenals. A genuine commitment could prepare the ground for more drastic cuts to bolster the efforts for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Of immediate concern is the question of nuclear danger, about which the Secretary-General has warned and which was recognized by the Millennium Summit in its Declaration. Such dangers may emanate from a vast array of sources, including nuclear weapons and reactors, spent fuels and other radioactive materials. Apart from the dangers posed by technical malfunctioning and deliberate political and military decisions, the unpredictable consequences stemming from nuclear theft and terrorism cannot remain in the realm of speculation indefinitely.

So-called tactical nuclear weapons, which constitute more than half of the global stockpile of nuclear warheads, are not covered by any agreement. Although conceived in the context of the cold war, such weapons continue to be maintained on high-alert status, which has lost its rationale. Continued reliance on strategic weapons for security has rendered those weapons redundant. They have diminished military value and have, in fact, become obsolete. Genuine nuclear disarmament should therefore begin with the elimination of these destabilizing weapons, whose very existence is fraught with the danger of unauthorized or accidental use. Immediate reductions in nuclear deployments will also contribute to a reduction of those dangers. Reducing the number of warheads and renouncing strategic doctrines based on the utility of nuclear weapons are other mutually reinforcing paths.

My delegation is reminded of an observation made by the Secretary-General in his report to the Millennium Assembly that "the nuclear weapon States continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace." (*A/54/2000, para. 249*) To

that remark we would like to add that nuclear weapons are dangerous in the hands of everyone.

Mr. Haug (Norway): First of all, let me join my colleagues in conveying our sincere sympathy and condolences to the Government and people of Indonesia for the horrific terrorist attack in Bali. Our sympathy and condolences also to those countries whose citizens died in the attack. This attack once again demonstrates that international terrorism constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

As pointed out in our general statement, the Norwegian Government continues to see the NPT as the cornerstone of international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the major pillars of the NPT regime. Universal adherence to, and the early entry into force of, the CTBT continues to be a high priority for Norway, despite the difficulties encountered in this process. We call upon the three non-signatories and the 10 non-ratifying States, whose signatures and ratifications are necessary for the Treaty's entry into force, to do so without further delay.

Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, it is important that the moratoriums on tests remain. Such self-imposed moratoriums cannot, however, replace the legally binding commitments represented by the signature and ratification of the CTBT. The CTBT's verification regime is at the core of the Treaty. Full implementation of the international monitoring system, as soon as possible, without waiting for the Treaty's entry into force, would represent a significant confidence- and security-building measure. Financial and diplomatic support to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization must continue unabated.

We are therefore pleased to sponsor the draft resolution that has been introduced on the CTBT (A/C.1/57/L.4). Likewise, we are pleased to sponsor the draft resolution on a fissile material cut-off treaty (A/C.1/57/L.44). A cut-off treaty is the next logical step on the multilateral arms-control agenda, and is essential if we are to advance the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

The Chairman: I now give the floor to the representative of Ireland to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/57/L.2 and A/C.1/57/L.3.

Mr. Dowling (Ireland): I wish to introduce two draft resolutions on behalf of their sponsors, who are members of the New Agenda Coalition — Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. The draft resolutions are contained in documents A/C.1/57/L.2 and A/C.1/57/L.3, respectively.

I propose to address draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.3 first. The draft resolution, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", is an effort to engage this Committee with a view to giving a new impetus to nuclear disarmament.

The sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2000 provided the forum for the elaboration of a set of agreements on the elements of and structure for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Importantly, the Final Document fundamentally alters the context in which nuclear disarmament must henceforth be pursued. That context is the unequivocal commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament.

In 1995, the NPT States parties renewed their commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective nuclear disarmament measures. By the time we reach the NPT Review Conference of 2005, a full decade will have passed. The undertakings made by States parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference have mapped out the practical steps through which such progress can be achieved. The current NPT Preparatory Committee process provides a facilitating framework. We, as an international community, must take the agreed practical steps. As we said in our statement in the general debate on 30 September, our continued indecision leaves us as vulnerable to a nuclear event as at any time in our history.

Now, then, is the time to reinvigorate the wider nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation debate so as to respond with tangible results. In this urgent context, the draft resolution, in its operative paragraphs, calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to deal specifically with nuclear disarmament; wishes to see the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty enter into force as soon as possible, with confirmation of the moratorium on all test explosions; expresses deep concern about the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by

the three States that have not yet acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and calls on them to do so and to bring into force the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency; seeks the resumption of negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; seeks to prevent an arms race in outer space and calls on the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee to deal with this issue; and calls on the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances and for recommendations on this issue to be made to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

The sponsors of this draft resolution welcome and intend to continue to conduct informal consultations with other delegations with a view to achieving the widest possible support. We will bring forward a revised version of the draft resolution later in the session, as we will wish to take account of certain new and welcome developments, such as Cuba's announcement of its intention to accede to the NPT and the finalization of the negotiations among the Central Asian States of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. As we have indicated in informal contacts, we are also ready to look at possible adjustments to the language of the text where clarification of the intent may be necessary, provided the thrust of the resolution remains unchanged.

I also take this opportunity to introduce, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.2, entitled "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons". This is a very straightforward draft resolution. As indicated in the general debate, the sponsors of the draft resolution believe that the existence of these weapons is a matter of concern for the international community. In particular, the commitment made in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference to the further reduction of non-strategic weapons creates for us all a priority which this draft resolution seeks to fulfil. The draft resolution expresses the view that the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be included as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

The draft resolution reflects these concerns and calls, in particular, for the issue to be addressed as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process; reductions to be carried out in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner; and the development of further confidence-building measures with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons and a reduction in their operational status. Both of these latter measures would be entirely consistent with efforts to achieve an irreversible and transparent process which leads to their elimination.

Again, as we have already indicated with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.3, the sponsors of this draft resolution are very open to comments on the draft from other delegations and will continue informal consultations with a view to bringing forward a revised text somewhat later.

We believe that the two draft resolutions we are putting forward can act as a catalyst for meaningful progress and concrete action. They have the necessary operational flexibility to meet the concerns of all like-minded States. Under-Secretary-General Dhanapala, in his introductory remarks two weeks, ago referred to the need for results-based disarmament. The two draft resolutions being submitted by the New Agenda Coalition are tabled in that spirit and we invite like-minded States to support them also in a spirit of shared global concern.

Mr. Kadiri (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): Nuclear arms are undeniably the most dangerous and frightening weapons of mass destruction that have ever been designed by humankind. They continue to threaten the eradication of all vestiges of life from the surface of our little planet.

This threat justifies the consensual determination of the international community to make the elimination of those weapons a central priority. The proliferation of such weapons in today's world is a fundamental sign of the lack of trust among States, despite the fact that a sense of the common fate of individuals and peoples continues to grow with the acceleration of globalization.

Of course, praiseworthy and considerable efforts to reduce such weapons have been undertaken unilaterally and bilaterally. In that respect, we welcome the conclusion last May of the Moscow Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.

However, praiseworthy as such efforts may be, they are no substitute for the total elimination of those weapons, which remains the international community's ultimate objective and the best guarantee against the threat of such weapons.

The positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allowed us to hope that we were making progress towards multilateral and irreversible nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, however, very few specific results followed. Even the proceedings of the first preparatory session for the 2005 NPT Review Conference were unable to achieve a consensus on questions of procedure, particularly the need for States parties to submit regular reports on the implementation of their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments. We hope that the second preparatory session, which will take place next year, will provide another opportunity to take up the questions pending with a greater sense of responsibility and more transparency and common will to strengthen multilateral non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regimes.

Of course, the bioterrorist threat is a great concern. But we believe that it should encourage us to strengthen regimes of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, nuclear weapons are the most difficult aspect of the problem.

The Kingdom of Morocco attaches great importance to disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It fully endorses the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and believes that removing the obstacles that continue to impede universalization of the NPT and the entry into force of the CTBT is the best way to contribute to peace-building and world security. Based on that, my country wishes to reiterate its full support for the efforts made at the international level to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT, whose role is to put in place the necessary structures for international verification of nuclear tests. In that regard, we support the draft resolutions related to that issue.

We are convinced that review of the nuclear question by the Conference on Disarmament is also a main concern to non-nuclear States. Therefore, we support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, as an essential aspect of nuclear non-proliferation and the strengthening of international security. It is clear that commitments made by States within the framework of the NPT and the decisions of treaty review conferences undoubtedly contribute to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to creating a climate of trust in international relations. Similarly, we believe that the universalization of a system of guarantees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and strengthening its means of verification will continue to be an important factor in consolidating instruments of nuclear non-proliferation.

Nevertheless, we believe that the fight against nuclear proliferation should not thwart the legitimate aspirations of developing countries that are opting for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Nigeria, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.38.

Mr. Udedibia (Nigeria): Let me join previous speakers, on behalf of my delegation, in expressing our condolences to the Government and people of Indonesia and to all other countries that were victims of terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia, over the weekend.

I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/57/L.38, entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship training and advisory services", on behalf of the following countries: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Ethiopia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The delegations of Sierra Leone and Laos have also requested to be included among the sponsors of this draft resolution.

The United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Training and Advisory Services has continued to

contribute significantly to developing greater awareness of the importance and benefits of disarmament and better understanding of concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament and security, as well as enhancing the knowledge and skills of fellows, allowing them to participate more effectively in efforts in the field of disarmament at all levels.

The programme has trained a large number of officials from Member States throughout its 24 years of existence, many of whom hold positions of responsibility within their own Governments. The forms of assistance available under the programme to Member States, in particular to developing countries, will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow in the ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral.

The draft resolution reaffirms the decision contained in annex IV of the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General, approved by the Assembly in its resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978. It also expresses appreciation to the Government of Germany for hosting participants of the programme since 1980, to the Government of Japan on the occasion of its twentieth annual study visit for the fellows, which included events in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and to the Government of the United States for having organized in 2001 a specific study programme in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme.

It also expresses appreciation to the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Monterey Institute of International Studies for having organized specific study programmes in the field of disarmament in their respective areas of competence, thereby contributing to the overall objectives of the programme. It also commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out.

The draft resolution already has a large number of sponsors from all regions. It has always been adopted without a vote at previous sessions of the General Assembly. We express our appreciation to this Committee and to the General Assembly for having adopted the draft resolution without a vote at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly. We, therefore, urge its adoption without a vote at this session.

Mr. Sanders (Netherlands): Since this is the first time I take the floor in this Committee, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your appointment. It is a pleasure to work under your guidance. Please be assured of the support of my delegation. We have full confidence in your ability to bring the work of this Committee to a successful conclusion.

First of all, allow me to express on behalf of the Netherlands Government our deep sympathy and condolences to Indonesia and to those countries whose citizens have fallen victim to the abhorrent terrorist act that took place in Bali over the weekend.

I have not taken the floor to speak about nuclear disarmament, but I wish to draw representatives' attention to the following.

This year, we celebrate the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. In the Register, Member States are requested to report on a voluntary basis on imports and exports of seven categories of major conventional arms and, if they wish, on their holdings. Over the last 10 years, more than 162 Governments have participated one or more times in this reporting instrument, while almost all the major producers, exporters and importers of conventional arms have reported regularly to the Register. The Secretariat estimates that the Register captures more than 95 per cent of the global trade in the seven categories of major conventional arms that it covers. Over the past 10 years, the Netherlands, with the support of more than 120 co-sponsors, has submitted the transparency in armaments resolution to the First Committee to support the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

The reason for my taking the floor is to tell the Committee that, to mark the tenth anniversary of the Register, all delegations are invited to a symposium that will be organized by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the Governments of Japan and the Netherlands, with the support of the delegations of Canada and Germany. This symposium will be held tomorrow, Tuesday 15 October, in conference room 1 from 3 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. The symposium will be followed by a reception. A leaflet was circulated in this room last week giving all the details.

I would greatly appreciate representatives' attendance at the symposium and I very much look forward to seeing them tomorrow.

Mr. Salander (Sweden): Let me first express Sweden's condolences and sympathy to Indonesia and also to other countries affected by the attack in Bali.

I have taken the floor in order to inform all delegations that the Non-Governmental Organization Committee on Disarmament, together with the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, invite representatives to a seminar on practical confidence-building measures, entitled "Does good governance of the security sector matter?" We invite all interested delegations to the seminar, which will be held on Wednesday between 1.45 p.m. and 5 p.m. in the Church centre across the street, where lunch will also be provided.

Five papers have been distributed today. They are also to be found in a white envelope on the table by the entrance. The speakers on Wednesday will discuss the growing recognition of good governance of the security sector as a political and military confidence-building measure. All delegations are welcome.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.